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The Jatropha Biofuels Sector in Tanzania 2005-9: 





Biofuel production has recently attracted much attention. Some anticipate substantial social 
and environmental benefits, while at the same time expecting sound profitability for investors. 
Others are doubtful, envisaging large trade-offs between the pursuit of social, environmental 
and economic objectives, particularly in poor countries in the tropics. The paper explores 
these issues in Tanzania, which has been an African forerunner in the cultivation of a bio-oil 
shrub called Jatropha curcas L. We trace how isolated Jatropha biofuel experiments 
developed since early 2005 towards a sectoral production and innovation system, and we 
investigate to what extent that system has been capable of developing ànd maintaining 
sustainable practices and producing sustainable outcomes. The application of evolutionary 
innovation theory allows us to view the developments in the sector as a result of evolutionary 
variation and selection on the one hand, and revolutionary contestation between different 
coalitions of stakeholders on the other. Both these processes constitute significant engines of 
change. While variation and selection are driven predominantly by localised technical and 
agronomic learning, the conflict-driven dynamics are highly globalised and occur primarily as 
a result of reflexive learning about problematic sustainability impacts. The sector is found to 
have moved some way towards a full sectoral innovation and production system, but it is 
impossible to predict whether a viable sector with a strong “triple bottom line” orientation 
will ultimate emerge, since many issues surrounding the social, environmental and financial 
sustainability still remain unresolved, especially relating to local and global governance. 
 
Key words: biofuels, evolutionary theory, innovation systems, sustainability, stakeholder 
conflict, learning, Tanzania.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Biofuel production from the tropical plant Jatropha curcas L. has recently attracted much 
attention. It has been widely claimed to be the only early biofuel that is not a food crop and 
can grow on marginal lands, thereby avoiding competition with food production and even 
helping in soil regeneration and erosion prevention (e.g., Jongschaap et al., 2007; Achten et 
al., 2007, 2008, ProForest, 2008; IFAD, 2010). Tanzania – along with India – have been 
major forerunners in attracting initiatives in this line of business (GEXSI, 2008). A survey of 
emerging Jatropha biofuels activities conducted in March-June 2005 uncovered a number of 
recently-started experiments (van Eijck, 2007; van Eijck and Romijn, 2008, Caniëls and 
Romijn, 2008). A second survey carried out in Sept-Dec 2008 (Roks and van Vlimmeren, 
2009) revealed a veritable explosion of activities, organised in a variety of business models.   
The aims of this paper are to: (1) explore to what extent, and how the Jatropha biofuel 
experiments in Tanzania have developed towards a fully fledged sectoral production and 
innovation system; and (2) investigate whether that system has developed ànd maintained 
sustainable practices and produced sustainable outcomes.  
Following the UN World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) and the 
United Nations 2005 World Summit, sustainable development is referred to as development 
that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. In general terms, this implies the creation and 
maintenance of a good balance between economic, environmental and social/equity 
considerations. In this paper we will refer to these as “People, Planet, Profit”, or PPP. 
Obviously, each of the three generic PPP dimensions consists of various sub-dimensions, but 
unlike the main dimensions, the characteristics of the sub-dimensions are largely specific to 
time, place and sector.  The Jatropha biofuels sector in Tanzania has been widely pushed 
because of its alleged potential to mitigate global warming and restore degraded tropical 
ecosystems (two environmental sub-dimensions), avoid competition with food production and 
create reliable opportunities for boosting local livelihoods (two social sub-dimensions), 
alongside promising a sound economic boost at the macro and local micro level (two 
economic sub-dimensions).  
Our methodology is grounded in evolutionary innovation theory, and combines two 
different types of analysis. The first type concerns the question of how technologies and 
associated organisational forms and business practices have arisen and evolved over time 
through evolutionary variation and selection. The second type is a study of how different   5 
stakeholders have attempted to safeguard their interests in processes of debate, coalition 
formation, power play and conflict. This highly globalised process of contestation is found to 
be a key driver of sectoral development alongside more locally-based evolutionary variation 
and selection. Stakeholders differ predominantly in terms of the importance they attach to the 
various (sub-)dimensions of sustainability, which is reflected in their actions. We show that in 
a newly emerging sector such as this one, where so many contentious issues are at play, the 
sustainability performance and outcomes of the sector as a whole arise from the co-evolution 
of technology and organisation through gradual learning on the one hand, and opposing 
societal forces on the other. Thus, the paper also seeks to make an innovative theoretical 
contribution by expanding the role of societal contestation and conflict in evolutionary 
innovation systems research. 
In section 2 and 3 we outline the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the data 
gathering. In section 5 we apply the framework to the Jatropha case in Tanzania. Our own 
two surveys constitute the main sources, supplemented with secondary sources such as press 
reports, NGO studies, company reports, reports from other researchers, etc. Section 5 comes 
into four parts, which trace sequentially how the sector evolved from early 2005 to late 2009. 
Section 6 teases out the key stumbling blocks and unresolved sustainability issues in the 
sector that arise from the analysis in section 5, and reflects on the merits and possible 
limitations of our methodology. 
 
2. Conceptual starting point: Systems of innovation 
 
A logical point of departure for addressing our objectives is the innovation systems literature 
(e.g., Edquist, 1997; Lundvall, 1992), in which innovation is seen as a collective process 
driven by learning, involving a wide variety of interacting agents. The systems perspective 
also points us towards the importance of sectoral structures and institutions, and how they 
impact on learning and innovation. It allows for a holistic interpretation of economic 
development as driven by co-evolving technologies and societal factors (Malerba, 2004).  
There are several distinct sub-sets of innovation systems literature, not all of which are 
suitable for analysing the dynamics of newly emerging systems and analysing PPP-
sustainability issues and how these interact with systems development. Only the more recently 
developed systems approaches include an explicit focus on societal and environmental 
sustainability. These approaches address the question how, and under what conditions, more 
„environmentally friendly‟ innovations can emerge, develop and be broadly accepted in   6 
society to the point where they can begin to offer superior performance characteristics over 
extant unsustainable practices, thus enabling a so-called socio-technical „transition‟ to occur 
(for a good review, see Coenen and Díaz López, 2010). One of these approaches is Strategic 
Niche Management (SNM), which has its roots in evolutionary transition studies (e.g., 
Hoogma et al. 2002; Kemp et al. 2001, 1998; Weber et al. 1999; Elzen et al. 2004; Raven, 
2005). SNM posits that successful radical innovations with environmentally sustainable 
characteristics emanate from socio-technical experiments in which various stakeholders 
collaborate and exchange knowledge and experience, thus embarking on an interactive 
learning process that will facilitate the incubation of new technologies. This occurs in a 
protected space called a 'niche' (Hoogma et al. 2002, 30).  
In a later refinement of the SNM framework, which we also follow in this study, SNM 
writers have made a distinction between two types of interlinked niche-levels in which 
technological development and diffusion processes take place: the so-called „global‟ niche 
level and the local niche level. The global level is where the emerging technological trajectory 
can be seen. It consists of accumulated, global, abstract and generic knowledge. Local niches 
(which are for instance national or regional) feed new knowledge into the global niche, and 
can also tap into the accumulated knowledge that is available at the global niche level. In this 
paper, the global niche level primarily refers to the international level. The local niche level 
consists of the set of projects and experiments carried out by actors in Tanzania, using their 
own networks and knowledge, and a specific configuration of the technology that is locally 
relevant. 
Niche experiments take place in the context of a 'socio-technical regime', which essentially 
defines the established way of doing things in a particular sector. It comprises "… the whole 
complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, production process technologies, 
product characteristics, skills and procedures, established user needs, regulatory requirements, 
institutions and infrastructures" (Hoogma et al. 2002, 19). There can even be more than one 
relevant regime for a radically new innovation. Radical innovations often require the building 
of entire new value chains, which may cut across different sectors of economic activity (e.g. 
Raven, 2007). In our biofuels case, no less than four regimes come into play, namely (fossil) 
energy, agriculture, oil processing, and land use & ownership customs and practices.  
In turn, the regime(s) is (are) embedded in a contextual 'landscape' – a set of structural 
societal factors such as demographics, political system, cultural patterns and lifestyles, and 
macro-economic conditions (Raven, 2005, 31-32). The landscape is beyond the direct 
influence of niche and regime actors. Changes at the landscape level most often take place   7 
very slowly, but sudden changes have also been known to happen (as in the case of the oil 
crises in the 1970s, political coups, or unexpected natural disasters). 
Another  line of innovation systems research with a strong sustainability focus is the 
Technological Innovation System (TIS) approach (e.g., Hekkert et al., 2007), which - 
compared to SNM - is more narrowly focused on the development of technological systems, 
and hones in on the critical functions that have to be fulfilled in these systems in order to 
generate truly sustainable innovations. Both SNM and TIS focus on newly emerging 
innovation systems that generate innovations with environmentally promising characteristics. 
They try to analyse the socio-economic and environmental learning trajectories involving 
incubation and commercialisation, and the outcomes of these processes.  
Major differences between stakeholder priorities and agendas are recognised in these 
approaches. These problems are explained in terms of tensions between progressive 
innovation-promoting (niche) actors and conservative actors in the established regime or 
technological-system context, who try to oppose promising novelties to safeguard their vested 
interests (see, e.g., Smith, 2007). For example, the TIS framework speaks in terms of the need 
to engage in struggle for legitimation of sustainable radical innovations in renewable energy 
and transport, because incumbent technologies, actors and institutions in these sectors have 
had many decades to secure their powerful and organised positions. Not only may they be 
hesitant to embrace radical innovations in their area, but they may actively try to block their 
progress. Much of the early efforts of an emerging technological innovation system thus have 
to be spent on legitimation – activities aimed at increasing social acceptance and establishing 
compliance with relevant institutions (Bergek et al., 2008). There is a very similar argument 
underlying the dynamics of the multi-level framework upon which SNM has been crafted. As 
Geels (2004) explains, there are various organisational commitments and vested interests of 
existing organisations and commitments by people to the continuation of existing systems. 
“Powerful incumbent actors may try to suppress innovations through market control or 
political lobbying. Industries may even create special organisations, which are political forces 
to lobby on their behalf” (p. 911). 
While this „niche-regime translation‟ (or „technological system – context‟) perspective on 
actor contestation is probably an accurate representation of reality in many cases, it is too 
restrictive for contentious new sectors such as biofuels. Stakeholders with opposing (or 
aligned, or complementary) interests can pop up anywhere in society – not only in the regime 
(or context). The potential social and environmental consequences are expected to be so 
dramatic that many groups and individuals from all walks of life want to engage in the debate   8 
about where the new sector should go, if anywhere. Relatedly, the societal and environmental 
sustainability of the new technologies in question themselves become an issue of contention. 
As their impacts begin to crystallise out in practice, they seem to fall short on several initial 
promises, or at least their performance becomes open to multiple interpretations.  
In other words, in these cases we do not have a clear scenario of progressive and genuinly 
sustainability-focused niche players versus defenders of interests vested in incumbent 
technologies with non-sustainable characteristics. This type of situation has been captured 
well in a recent paper by Sengers et al (2010), who deliberately put the word sustainability 
between inverted commas to indicate the growing debate about the supposed beneficial 
qualities of biofuels fed by experts, NGOs, and even corporate actors. They note that “ ... not 
much is known about the dynamics of these radical shifts in depicting sustainable 
technologies, and how this kind of criticism, especially as ventilated through the media, 
affects biofuel practices” (p 5013). In an analysis of distributed generation technologies based 
on the SNM perspective, similar patterns of growing contestation and confusion about the 
sustainability performance of the new technologies are observed (van der Vleuten and Raven, 
2006). The authors conclude that “...technological change as well as technological stability 
should be analysed as potentially contested processes.” (p. 3747). Similarly, Hård (1993) 
criticized the socio-technical system concept for one-sidedly emphasising harmonious 
interactions between components whilst silencing processes of conflict and dysfunctionality. 
We concur with these studies in the sense that when we want to study the emergence of 
radical „sustainable‟ technologies such as biofuels, contestation and conflict need to be an 
integral – and often constructive – part of the innovation process itself, rather than merely 
forming a contextual drag on it by hampering progressive innovation forces in the niche.  
Thus, what we require for a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the Jatropha 
sector is an analytical tool that is capable of integrating a focus on gradual variation and 
selection in a newly emerging innovation system, with a more explicit analysis of human 
controversies and actions around PPP issues as a second dominant driver of change. This 
approach is more comprehensive than what has been done so far in innovation systems 
frameworks such as SNM and TIS, because contestation processes will be endogenised 
comprehensively within the framework itself. Only then can we understand how evolutionary 
variation and selection on the one hand, and conflictuous inter-stakeholder dynamics on the 
other influence each other over time, and how sustainability-related outcomes are co-
produced by these two motors of change.   
   9 
3.  Sectoral evolution & sustainability: A contestation-augmented systems 
framework 
 
Our starting point for developing such a framework is Greiner‟s (1972) model of 
organisational development. The essence of this model is the interspersing of periods of 
incremental learning and adaptation with upheaval and turbulence, in his case in one 
organisational entity. The model consists of a number of stages, each of which represents a 
different developmental form of the entity. During each stage, gradual incremental change 
and adaptation processes are at work. This is first-order change that remains within an 
existing framework, producing variations on the same theme (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995: 
522). However, there comes a time when people working in the entity begin to encounter 
fundamental misalignments between the requirements of good organisational functioning and 
existing organisational routines. As Greiner puts it: “During such periods of crisis, ... those 
companies] that are unable to abandon past practices and effect major organizational changes 
are likely either to fold or to level off in their growth rates.” (p 401). Adjustments during these 
periods constitute second-order change, because they tend to involve discontinuous and 
unpredictable departures from past patterns (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995: 522).  
Greiner‟s explanation of his model is worth quoting:  
“… variation, selection … explains the form of the stages, while the dialectics explain 
the underlying dynamics of movement [from one form to the next]. … I put the crises 
in the model because I could not find data showing the stages as naturally and 
automatically evolving one after the other. This is not a model where a future life or 
end stage is assured. … there is no envisioned end state that pulls the process – for me 
it is the current dynamics within the organisation that are driving it forward – 
convergence around the thesis of each stage and then running into resistance 
(antithesis) and requiring re-orientation for the conflict to be resolved. The model in 
fact has no ending and concludes with a question mark.” (Interview with Greiner, as 
quoted in Van de Ven and Poole, 1995: 530).  
Greiner‟s model was designed in a period when social and environmental sustainability 
issues were still primarily subservient to the pursuit of profit for commercial gain. Back then, 
the key contentious issue concerned the different ways in which economic efficiency could be 
increased and competitive advantage ensured, while the primacy of those aims themselves 
was not questioned except by a fringe minority. The current challenges raised in relation to 
recently emerged sectors such as biofuels, nanotechnology and biotechnology are more   10 
fundamental. Societal values have evolved to reflect broader environmental and equity 
concerns (e.g., Korten, 2009), while those new technologies also have the potential of 
generating dramatic societal impacts. These concerns are reflected in different stakeholder 
experiences, interests, and perceptions with respect to the profound environmental and 
social/ethical sustainability implications that a sector may give rise to, in its pursuit to become 
economically viable. This insight is reflected in more recent „conventionalist‟ sociological 
works about technological change at the sectoral level, such as Kaplan and Murray (2010). 
They posit that the financial profits pursued by Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are only one 
among many interpretations of the value of a new technology. Other parties can have different 
values, such as civic duty, attainment of fame, technological excellence, creativity, ecological 
consciousness, etc. Such value differences can lead to contestation and conflict, which can 
even lead to moments of crisis and breakdown when a given technological trajectory fails to 
mobilise sufficient societal support. These breakdowns create new opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to find alternative ways of exploiting their new knowledge. Thus, in these 
sociological models, too, we recognise the alternation of periods of incremental progress 
along a given technological trajectory with moments of turmoil, which was also a defining 
characteristic of Greiner‟s early model.  
We introduce these concepts into a multi-level sustainability-focused innovation systems 
perspective. In this paper we choose SNM as our systems approach because of its multilevel 
perspective, which constitutes a convenient way to express and order the dynamics of a newly 
emerging innovation system. This is needed here, since we want to explain the emergence of a 
new sector. This is hard to do without studying the contextual forces in the 'landscape' and the 
'regime' that give rise to its birth.  
In the SNM perspective, evolutionary variation and selection mechanisms are commonly 
analyzed as three interrelated and mutually reinforcing niche processes (Geels and Raven, 
2007; Raven, 2005, p. 43):  
(1) Voicing and shaping of people‟s expectations concerning the innovation. This is necessary 
in order to match the promises held out by the innovation and the stakeholders' expectations 
about it, with the needs in society that the innovation is meant to satisfy.  
(2) Experimentation-based learning about the possibilities and constraints of the innovation, 
specific application domains, its acceptability, suitable policies to regulate or promote it, and 
so on.  
(3) The constitution of a co-operating actor network, especially to enable early feedback from 
users and for the actors to develop a common core vision ('alignment').    11 
The main effect of integrating sociological models of conflictuous change into an SNM 
perspective is a more distinctive phasing of the system‟s innovation development trajectory. 
The essential difference with the conventional SNM framework is that at certain points in 
time gradual variation and selection become insufficient vehicles for solving certain emerging 
problems and contradictions. Conflict then becomes a necessary condition for further sectoral 
development. Conversely, the original SNM approach (and other innovation systems models) 
predicts the fastest progress in the absence of conflict, because of easy alignment of 
expectations and efficient collaborative learning. 
The empirical analysis in section 5 is structured as indicated in Figure 1. The first three 
rows constitute the three main conceptual levels in the multi-level SNM framework. In our 
analysis we fit the processes represented by these concepts onto a time line, on which we 
distinguish four distinct stages in the evolution of the Jatropha sector, as indicated in the 
columns of the table. By analysing the three SNM innovation drivers at the niche level, 
networking, learning and voicing and shaping of expectations, we can deduce to what extent 
these are being driven by evolutionary variation and selection and/or by revolutionary 
contestation and conflict in each period. In the first three periods we are able to adopt a clear 
sequential approach. From the analysis of the three SNM processes we are able to distil the 
change motors in operation. In the fourth period the cause and effect relationships between 
SNM processes and change motors become more complex due to the emergence of broad 
reflexive learning about societal impacts in the (global and local) Jatropha niche, which is 
both cause and effect of the operation of the change motors. This complex co-evolution is best 
shown through a joint discussion of the niche processes and the evolutionary drivers in their 
mutual interaction. The feedback loop from the change motors to the SNM niche processes is 
indicated with an upward pointing arrow in Figure 1. 
 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
4. Data collection methodology 
 
In the two surveys in early 2005 and late 2008, we tried to identify all significant socio-
technical experiments (as defined in SNM terms) with Jatropha in Tanzania by talking to 
local people who were knowledgeable about the budding sector, primarily Ministry officials 
and members of the National Biofuels Taskforce (started in 2006), NGO representatives, 
academics and private entrepreneurs. We relied on the snowball method, starting with a few   12 
known experts, and identifying others through these people. An "experiment" is understood as 
an activity undertaken by an individual or a group aimed at growing Jatropha, seed pressing, 
or developing end-use applications for the oil or the seedcake. Most of the experiments took 
the form of development projects led by local NGOs and governmental agencies, but there 
were also some for-profit ventures. Most had foreign connections involving financial support 
or knowledge transfer. In the first survey, 17 experiments were found, while the second 
survey uncovered close to 40. The great majority of these were visited and a few were 
contacted by e-mail. Most early experiments were situated in the Arusha and Kilimanjaro 
regions in the northeast. Others were situated in Morogoro and along the coast. Later 
experiments were also found in western Tanzania. Participants located outside Tanzania (such 
as international donors and car manufacturers) were not interviewed. 
The interviews with the representatives of the Jatropha experiments were held face to 
face, with the help of a detailed checklist of open-ended questions. Each interview covered 
information about the goal, history and nature of the Jatropha-activities undertaken. The 
respondents were asked to provide details about the development trajectory of their Jatropha 
activities, covering actor network activities, people‟s learning processes, and the dynamics of 
their expectations. Considering the complexity of the processes, the experimental nature of 
the research, and the low level of literacy and capacity for abstract thinking among some 
respondents, we confined ourselves to gathering mostly qualitative information through 
informal discussions, loosely guided by our checklist.  
 
5. The Jatropha biofuels sector during 2005-9: Emergence, evolution and conflict 
 
The discussion in this section is organised into four time periods. For this purpose we 
follow the concept of the industry life-cycle model with an embryonic/proto stage, 
introduction, growth, maturity and decline (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). An overview of 
the key SNM processes and the two drivers of change is presented in Table 1 at the end of 
section 5, which is a filled-out version of Figure 1.  
 
5.1 The ‘proto’ stage: landscape & regime dynamics and niche emergence in 2005 
 
Landscape conditions 
The 'landscape'-canvas against which the Tanzanian Jatropha sector emerged in 2004-5 was 
one of increasing concerns about global warming. The Kyoto Protocol came into force on 16   13 
Feb 2005, focusing public attention on the issue. The ratification also created possibilities to 
offset carbon emissions in developed countries through trade in carbon credits with 
developing countries under the CDM mechanism, which raised high expectations of profitable 
investments in renewable energy schemes in poor countries (although only one afforestation 
project and not a single Jatropha project had been CDM-funded in Tanzania by 2010). Other 
important landscape pressures were an increasing awareness of the finiteness of fossil fuels, 
fast rising energy demand from emerging Asian economies, and structural unreliability of 
Middle Eastern oil supplies due to political problems. High and rising prices of fossil fuels 
were an important manifestation of these rising concerns. All these factors have been major 
drivers of recent investments in, and official promotion of biofuels around the world 
(Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2008; Hazell and Pachauri, 2006). For example, the 2006 EU 
strategy document concerning biofuels states: “...The EU is supporting biofuels with the 
objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, boosting the decarbonisation of transport 
fuels, diversifying fuel supply sources and developing long-term replacements for fossil oil.” 
(European Commission, 2006, p.3). Meanwhile, potential investors in biofuels began to 
perceive the attractiveness of vast areas of uncultivated land in Africa that could possibly be 
exploited for biofuel cultivation (Mercer, 2003). Such biofuels were seen to hold promise of 
generating energy for biodiesel and bio-ethanol with a substantially lower greenhouse gas 
footprint than conventional fossil diesel and petrol. Many observers considered biofuels to be 
the only feasible option for the substitution of fossil fuels in the transport sector (Peters and 
Thielmann, 2008).  
Tanzania began to attract much investor attention in an early stage for several reasons that 
have to do with its national 'landscape'-characteristics. Foreign investors generally find it an 
attractive country because of its political stability, democracy, relatively low violent crime, 
treaties to protect foreign investment and recent economic liberalisation (CIA Factbook, 
2008). Foreign investment is actively facilitated by the Tanzanian Investment Center. There is 
also a large workforce which is relatively well trained due to prioritization of education 
during the past decades. Likewise, many aid organisations find Tanzania a good place to 
execute projects and programmes (CIA Factbook, 2008; van Eijck and Romijn, 2008).  
However, there have also been unfavourable factors: Tanzania suffers from all kinds of 
problems associated with poverty. Its policymaking and implementation capacity is limited, 
its degree of industrialization low, and its infrastructure network inadequate. Road transport is 
time-consuming, difficult and costly. As we shall note later, these factors have influenced 
investors‟ choices about the set up of their biofuel supply chain.   14 
 
Regime conditions 
At the level of the 'regime', we have to consider the energy regime as well as the agricultural 
regime, the oil pressing regime, and the land regime. Regarding the energy regime, we can 
say that Tanzania has a high import-dependence on fossil fuels and an underdeveloped 
modern energy supply system. The electricity grid reaches just 11 % of the total population 
(EWURA, 2007), and frequent blackouts and power drops occur. Rural electricity coverage is 
estimated to be no more than 4% at best. Traditional sources of biomass fuel – charcoal and 
firewood – are becoming increasingly scarce and expensive. There is increasing deforestation 
due to land clearing for fuel and agriculture for an expanding population. Among different 
biofuels, Jatropha was seen to be particularly promising, because early publications noted its 
potential for marginal land regeneration and erosion prevention alongside energy provision 
(Openshaw, 2000). On the other hand, Tanzania's government budget has been highly 
dependent on import duties from fossil fuels, so that the introduction of new competing 
energy sources could face opposition. Also, in 2005 there was no renewable energy policy 
that could stimulate, facilitate and assist orderly market development of biofuels.  
Tanzania‟s agricultural regime also influences the prospects for the development of a 
viable biofuel niche. Tanzania‟s agricultural sector is dominated by vast numbers of 
traditional smallholders. These are poor marginal farmers, who have been suffering from 
structurally low prices of staples such as maize and cassava. They might be interested in 
switching over to a new cash crop such as Jatropha. Cash crop agriculture is already well 
established in Tanzania. However, no policy support for smallholders exists to make this 
happen. There are no micro credit programmes, or well-running extension services through 
which peasants can learn to cultivate new crops. Moreover, local farmers tend to have low 
faith in becoming outgrowers with new crops. Past experiences such as with the Moringe tree 
– promoted by the government some years ago – have been disappointing because of market 
collapse (Roks and van Vlimmeren, 2009).  
Yet another regime that is relevant to the establishment of a biofuel niche concerns post-
harvest oil processing technologies. Basic technological knowledge about press 
manufacturing and use exists in Tanzania, due to widespread use of vegetable oil presses for 
crops such as sunflower and castor; however there is no advanced knowledge about efficient 
high-capacity presses in the country.  
The fourth regime that needs to be discussed here is the land regime. Land can be leased 
by foreigners for up to 99 years, but acquisition of land is difficult, procedurally complex and   15 
time-consuming. Furthermore, many Tanzanian citizens and local and international NGOs 
oppose large-scale land acquisition by foreigners. This opposition goes back to colonial times 
and is mainly based on negative experiences in the past with different crops and resources. 
Some valuable resources, e.g. Tanzanite and gold, have been exploited by foreigners while 
Tanzanians have hardly benefited. There is considerable public fear that the same will happen 
when large patches of land will be exploited for biofuels (Odgaard, 2006; Laltaika, 2008; 
Sulle and Nelson, 2009).  
 
Niche processes 
It is against this landscape and regime background that the first activities towards the 
development of a Jatropha niche in Tanzania began to take shape. In 2005, we see just a few 
loosely connected single experiments. Network density is low, and the government is notably 
absent from it. There is no regulation, and no stimulation (van Eijck, 2007: 87), so we cannot 
yet speak of an innovation system in the sense of a set of interacting and interconnected 
learning agents with an accompanying institutional infrastructure and governance, as it is 
commonly defined by authors such as Malerba, Lundvall, and so on.  
There are just two key players, one NGO (Kakute), and one subsidiary of a small Dutch 
TNC (Diligent Energy Systems). Their business models are not yet clearly articulated. Kakute 
started its Jatropha activities with funding from the Mc Knight Foundation in 2000. It is 
pursuing an informal outgrower model, collecting seeds from farmers on an irregular basis 
(including seeds from wild Jatropha plants already growing in the region). These are pressed 
manually with a ram press. Production takes place on a small scale. Diligent had just begun 
operations in Tanzania in 2005, trying to contract small farmers as outgrowers to supply its 
prospective oil pressing facility in Arusha with seeds from small plants supplied by the 
company, which the farmers plant around their small plots as hedges. No large plantation 
cultivation was noted. 
Although there were already a diversity of actors in the cultivation stage, the oil pressing 
stage was incipient and the end-use stage almost non existent. This makes sense, since a full 
value chain can only be built up once sufficient oilseeds are available, and it takes 3-4 years 
for new plants to start bearing fruit. In the cultivation stage, the actor network was also found 
to be expanding quickly and becoming more diverse, with research institutes beginning to be 
involved. Several agronomic learning processes had already occurred, for example 
concerning ways of propagation of seed, irrigation, and planting distances. However, these 
learning processes had not yet been synthesized or shared among all the relevant actors.   16 
People's expectations about Jatropha's viability were generally highly positive. On hindsight 
(from the perspective of late 2009) people's seed yield estimates of 5 to 10 t/ha/yr have proved 
to be completely unrealistic, a clear sign of the underdevelopment of the sector.  
In oil pressing, we see a small but diverse actor network, mostly linked through Kakute 
which effectively acts as a channel for transfer of new information and effective practices 
among different stakeholders. Early technical learning by Diligent and Kakute was based on 
basic mechanized Sayari oil expellers made in Tanzania by a German aid-supported NGO in 
Morogoro, and on manual ram presses. There were no lessons about profitability of different 
press techniques yet, although some actors observed that the ram press is inefficient and 
unwieldy for producing larger quantities. There were no ideas either about what press 
capacity would ultimately be used, because of complete lack of information about market 
acceptability and suitability of the oil. There were also no lessons yet about the infrastructure 
and storage requirements of seeds and oil, although this aspect was expected to be important 
because seeds and oil are natural products. People's expectations about viable business models 
varied widely: some mentioned small pressing units in several rural places, from where the oil 
could be collected and distributed. Others envisaged one central pressing unit, with the seeds 
being collected from various places. Transport difficulties due to poor roads, and unreliability 
and inefficiency of equipment are seen as barriers to the development of the industry. 
At the usage-stage of the production chain, the network is embryonic because a 
commercial market for Jatropha oil and its by-products does not yet exist, while there is also 
no developed seed and oil supply system. However, actors had by then identified several 
different possible uses for Jatropha and were just beginning to engage in learning. First, 
actors had identified Jatropha oil as a potentially good diesel substitute in remote locations 
within Tanzania, or for export. Diligent was also exploring the behaviour of the pure plant oil 
(PPO) in car engines by converting one car engine to enable it to run on pure Jatropha oil. 
Diligent's experiments were to some extent supported by research at Eindhoven University of 
Technology (TUE) in the Netherlands, where an MSc project had started about the behaviour 
or Jatropha oil in diesel engines (Rabé, 2004). However, since Jatropha had never been used 
as a diesel substitute, lessons on acceptance by users and car manufacturers were still lacking.  
A second set of applications that was beginning to be investigated was the use of Jatropha 
seedcake for biogas production, as fertilizer, and as stove briquettes. Kakute had already 
conducted an experiment with a small biogas plant, which yielded mixed results because of 
unreliable gas pressure. There were no experiences with Jatropha as fertilizer or briquettes. 
Clearly, much technical (and societal) learning was still required here. The research in 2005   17 
concluded that seed cake applications had been explored only very marginally. This was 
identified as a major weakness for the development of the Jatropha innovation system, 
because productive use of the seedcake (which still contains about 50% of the oil) is crucial 
for making Jatropha biofuels profitable. 
A third possible application concerned the use of the pure plant oil (PPO) in oil lamps and 
cooking stoves. Kerosene lamps are widely used in the villages, but using Jatropha oil is 
expensive because a separate lamp with a thicker wick is required than what is normally used. 
Kakute has a small Jatropha-oil lamp factory, but no widespread market for this new lamp 
was found. Kakute has also experimented with a cooking stove prototype, but there has been 
no sharing of lessons and no continuous learning due to shortage of Jatropha oil. The stove 
prototype was not yet functioning properly and there were many complaints about fumes.  
Finally, Jatropha gave rise to some non energy-related by-products, notably medicinal 
soap, which is made by Kakute on a small-scale basis. The soap commands a small niche 
market. Users are happy but there is no clear strategy for upscaling and more systematic 
marketing.  
In sum, individual people's expectations about possible end-uses varied widely in the 
absence of developed end-markets. We could not find any systematic differences in beliefs 
and expectations among stakeholder groups; they all express great market optimism at this 
stage. There is no communication with potentially interested users who could provide useful 
information about their preferences and needs. This state of affairs is reflected in all the 
different potential Jatropha applications. This stage is driven by individual (rather than group-
based) vague beliefs and expectations, rather than facts and experiences.  
 
Evolutionary motors 
We now spell out the findings from the 2005 situation for the two transition drivers discussed 
in the previous section. At this early stage, it is evident that evolutionary variation is the 
dominant mode of progress. In particular we see variation emerging in the technologies used, 
e.g., three different agronomic practices for propagating Jatropha in the cultivation stage. 
Another example of variation is oil use, where participants had identified many different 
possibilities of using Jatropha or its by-products. We also see the early beginnings of what 
were later to become two distinct business models: (1) Diligent's commercial outgrower 
model, which combines contracting from many small-scale outgrowers located in different 
regions with centralised factory oil pressing in Arusha, with the aim to develop a national or 
even an international supply line; (2) Kakute‟s less commercially oriented outgrower model,   18 
with prime emphasis on empowerment of rural women through local income generation and 
local use of Jatropha products.  
We did not yet witness any evolutionary selection in terms of cultivation and pressing 
technologies, business practices, and business models. Learning has still been insufficient for 
lessons and experiences to accumulate to the point where people can make informed selection 
decisions. This stage is characterised by what Kempf (2007) has called 'limited first order 
learning' which is basically just technical learning about the key technical processes in the 
value chain. There are no wider lessons yet about the impact of the processes: about user 
acceptance, logistics, or possible toxicity. There are also no lessons yet about economic 
viability of Jatropha, although this is receiving everyone's attention and is subject to much 
speculation. The process of niche development as a whole is pulled mainly by highly 
optimistic yield expectations. 
Major social or environmental sustainability issues are not yet in view. In SNM 
terminology, there has been no reflexive societal learning. The second motor of change in our 
analytical framework, socio-political contestation and conflict, is not yet operating. We still 
see a reasonably harmonious process led by few individual actors with plenty of space in this 
vast country to pursue their own interests without having major effects on each other. At this 
embryonic stage there is no large influx of big investors whose activities could potentially 
have major effects on the rural ecological and social-economic scene. The public at large – 
both within Tanzania and abroad – is still hardly aware of Jatropha's emergence. To the 
extent that people are aware of it, there is just a vague sense, mostly based on heresay, that 
social and environmental impacts will be positive.  
 
5.2 ‘Introduction’: mounting landscape pressures and evolutionary variation in 2006-7 
 
Landscape conditions 
The favourable expectations generated in the early years of Jatropha niche development in 
Tanzania - as well as in other tropical countries such as India - fostered an international 
climate of great optimism regarding investment possibilities. This was simultaneously being 
stimulated by developments in the landscape: the IPCC published a report stating that it is 
90% certain that the increase of CO2 in the atmosphere over time is induced by human 
activity. It also stated that if the combustion of fossil fuels would not be reduced significantly 
within the next decades, a temperature increase of over 2 degrees Celsius will cause climate 
change with catastrophic consequences (IPCC, 2007). In its summary report for policy   19 
makers, the IPCC recommends the use of biofuels in several sectors (including dedicated 
liquid energy crops for the transport sector), and discusses several policy measures to boost 
investments and use, such as mandatory blending targets and subsidies (IPCC, 2007). The 
film „An Inconvenient Truth‟ produced by Al Gore also did much to enhance global public 
awareness of the dangers of human-induced climate change 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Inconvenient_Truth; Kolk and Pinkse, 2008; Sampei and 
Aoyagi-Usui, 2009). 
These global landscape developments were accompanied by a growing interest in western 
developed countries to utilise biofuels to combat climate change and enhance energy security. 
The EU adopted Directive 2003/30 (RED), in which it set indicative targets for biofuel 
consumption as road transport fuel of 5.75% by 2010, and 10% by 2020. In the US, a target 
was set of 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. In addition, according to the OECD, annual financial 
support given by the US, EU and Canada to stimulate the supply and use of biofuels had risen 
to US$ 11 billion in 2006 and was expected to rise further to approximately US$ 25 billion by 
2015 (Hauwermeiren, 2008). Thus, policy-induced market creation and subsidies for biofuel 
investment in the developed world became major inducements for expansion of Jatropha 
activities in tropical countries, including Tanzania. 
 
Regime conditions 
Energy regime conditions, both globally and in Tanzania, were equally favourable to early 
biofuel industry growth. Fossil oil prices in this period rose to around US$ 55-75 per barrel, 
which was much higher than the average price experienced in the previous two decades (see 
Figure 2). This raised expectations among investors that the production of biofuels like 
Jatropha could actually become competitive under market conditions. Conditions in the other 
three regimes essentially remained as in the earlier period.    
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Niche processes 
The combined occurrence of these landscape and regime trends heralded the second major 
phase in the industry's development, which is characterised by global hype.
i  There occurs a 
major influx by western transnational corporations (TNCs) into tropical countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. These companies were intent on the large-scale commercial 
cultivation of Jatropha predominantly for western markets of transport fuel and electricity-  20 
generation feedstocks, taking advantage of favourable market prospects created by the biofuel 
targets set in these countries as well as their lavish investment subsidies (e.g., ABN, 2007; 
Beattie, 2008; Knaup, 2008; FAO, 2008; GEXSI, 2008). Within just a few years, the stream 
of these investments had grown to such an extent that it began to attract considerable attention 
in the press in developed and developing countries alike. One CNN report estimated that more 
than 720.000 ha had been planted by spring 2008, expected to rise to over 21 million ha in 
2014 (Whiteman, 2008), out of an achievable total potential of around 30 million ha (Wille, 
2008). 
In Tanzania, the combination of the various global landscape pressures and positive 
expectations gave rise to a virtual deluge of foreign investments into the fledging Jatropha 
sector. A survey undertaken in the spring of 2008 identified a whole range of different 
initiatives and scales of production, varying from very small-scale production activities to 
extremely large plantations (or sets of plantations) exceeding 50,000 ha (Martin et al., 2009). 
In our own second survey, all these initiatives were found to be linked to foreign investors or 
aid donors (Roks and van Vlimmeren, 2009).  
At this stage we can also begin to differentiate between more or less distinct business 
models with distinctive technologies (Martin et al., 2009; Roks and van Vlimmeren, 2009): 
Local Multifunctional Platforms (LMPs); Large Plantations (LPs); and decentralised 
Outgrower-based Models (OMs).  
LMPs are established in rural areas, motivated by the potential for improving livelihoods 
through collective utilisation of local resources (Appropriate Technology, 2007). Two LMPs 
were set up in the remote Maasai villages of Engaruka and Leguruki. Designed to promote 
local economic development through community self-sufficiency, LMPs consist of a set of 
three basic interlinked machines placed behind one another: a small oil expeller, a generator 
set, and a maize mill. The idea is that local farmers will cultivate the plant as hedges round 
their fields and/or intercropped with food crops, and that the oilseed harvest would be 
sufficient in due course to substitute for fossil diesel as a feedstock for locally generated 
electricity (Wijgerse, 2007). The LMPs should stimulate activities such as maize milling, 
lighting, radio services and mobile phone charging. The LMPs are preferably run by local 
women‟s groups, and are meant to contribute to their empowerment. The model was copied 
from projects in Mali, where it was reportedly highly promising (UNDP, 2004).  
The LP side of the business-model spectrum consists of a number of western investors, 
mostly from EU countries, attracted by the Tanzanian government's welcoming attitude to 
large scale agricultural initiatives and backed up by a favourable biofuel investment climate   21 
and lavish subsidy schemes in their home countries. Since these projects are required to go 
through lengthy land acquisition procedures, they were still in their infancy during this stage, 
but their plans were grandiose. In one case, a company wanted to lease 81,000 ha of village 
land for conversion into 200 ha estate plots of Jatropha monoculture. It planned to remove 
existing vegetation using heavy duty imported machinery. It was also planning to conduct 
systematic agronomic experiments in collaboration with local and foreign universities to 
optimise Jatropha yields by means of pruning, mulching, and introducing pest and disease 
controls, and it wanted to introduce mechanical harvesting, never tried before with Jatropha 
(Romijn, 2008). Many of the LP schemes were being established in Tanzania's coastal zone, 
in view of their ambitions to export (Martin et al., 2009), in many cases through shipping out 
the raw agricultural product (Romijn, 2008). In 2007 the African Biodiversity Network 
(ABN) noted that 
"...the Tanzanian government is evidently committed to fast-tracking agrofuel 
initiatives, and switching over vast areas of land to sugar cane, palm oil and 
Jatropha. The most fertile lands, with best access to water are being targeted, 
even though these lands are already used for food production by small-scale 
farmers. Any talk of biofuel production for local energy consumption is 
undermined by the obvious intent of international investors to target foreign 
markets ... Also, there are no plans to invest in infrastructure in Tanzania to 
process agrofuels for local use" (ABN, 2007: 12).  
It should be noted, however, that the export orientation of these firms was also induced by 
the evident difficulties involved in developing a domestic market owing to landscape factors 
discussed earlier, namely bad infrastructure, bureaucratic government, and low purchasing 
power. The same argument can be made in relation to their choice for a vertically integrated 
supply chain. In a poor country, central plantations afford much easier and better control over 
feedstock supply than decentralised outgrower-based systems dependent on poorly educated 
and widely dispersed smallholder farmers.  
The OM business model constitutes the middle ground in the business spectrum. OM 
projects do not acquire own land (Sulle and Nelson, 2009), but source their seed supply from 
independent farmers. The OM thus affords a more gradual growth trajectory, enabling firms 
to start experimenting with oil pressing on a small scale, growing gradually by extending their 
contract farmer network over time. They also utilise well-established Jatropha plants that are 
already growing wild in some areas, such as Shinyanga and Singida. These companies were 
not established with a definite plan where there main market should be. Exports as well as   22 
domestic and even local sales (for instance, to a soap producer and to local eco-safari 
companies) were being targeted, depending on the economic viability. In any case they plan 
to utilise the Jatropha by-products (hulls and seedcake) locally, so their market strategy is 
more mixed than that of the LMPs and the LPs (Roks and van Vlimmeren, 2009).  
 
Evolutionary motors 
Summing up the main developments during 2006-7, we see a continuation of the evolutionary 
variation motor of change. Compared with 2005, the learning in the niche is broadening from 
purely technical aspects to business organisation and coordination. While three distinct 
business models begin to crystallise out, we cannot yet identify any evolutionary selection in 
the sense of failing alternatives falling by the wayside, or any of the three emerging models 
being clearly preferred over the other(s).  
As far as antagonistic processes go, we cannot yet see full-blown conflict, but we can 
discern the first signs of these in early publications by NGOs such as the ABN. Interestingly, 
the ABN actually operates from within the African Jatropha niche, since it is a regional 
network promoting sustainable biofuel practices involved in collecting and disseminating 
lessons from project experiences in different African countries to relevant niche stakeholders.  
 
5.3 Frustrated early growth: Landscape instability and seeds of conflict during the 1




The first half of 2008 is marked by major instabilities in the global and local Tanzanian 
landscape, which have had dramatic effects on the development of the Tanzanian Jatropha 
niche. These developments coincided with significant learning in the niche, due to the 
accumulation of experiences from the cultivation of Jatropha as a managed agricultural crop. 
Since Jatropha takes about 3 years to start yielding seeds, the earliest Jatropha projects in 
Tanzania and in other countries such as India were beginning to get their first results around 
this time. From these results, it was becoming increasingly clear that although Jatropha is 
indeed able to survive under hostile environmental conditions, its seed and oil yields are much 
higher in conditions where the plant has adequate access to soil nutrients and water (FAO, 
2008; Achten et al., 2007, 2008, The Guardian, 2009).  
At around the same time, global food prices began to climb to the highest levels since the 
1970s. The FAO (2008) gave warning about serious implications for food security among   23 
poor populations around the world. It forecasted global food-import expenditures to reach 
US$ 1035 billion in 2008, 26 percent higher than the previous peak in 2007. It also pointed 
out that the bulk of the anticipated growth in the world food import bill would come from 
higher expenditures on rice (77 percent), wheat (60 percent) and vegetable oils (60 percent) 
(Ibid, p. 107). These emerging facts intensified and expanded a debate, until then limited to 
the USA and Brazil, about competition between food and fuels (Rathmann et al., 2010). The 
World Bank (Mitchell, 2008a) and the OECD (2008) came out with reports claiming that 
biofuel production, spurred by attractive subsidies, minimum blending requirements, and 
skyrocketing fossil oil prices in an overheating global economy (see under „regime‟, below), 
had been one of the main reasons for the increasing food prices. This, coinciding with a 
drought in Eastern Africa, caused great concern in the region, where periodic food shortages 
have been an issue for a long time (The Citizen, 23 July 2008). In Tanzania it began to spur 
major controversies over the large scale biofuel plantations that had recently been established 
in the country, for example in the form of press articles, parliamentary & academic debates 
and NGO activity (see „niche‟ discussion below).  
Another major global landscape factor that began to come into play was that several 
bodies began to raise questions whether biofuels were really as GHG-friendly or -neutral as 
they were initially claimed to be. In January 2008, two articles in Science caused a worldwide 
stir, pointing out that biofuel environmental life cycle studies so far had neglected GHG 
emissions due to land conversion prior to start of cultivation. Palm oil plantations established 
on former tropical forest lands in Malaysia and Indonesia would need to run for over 300 
years for the initial carbon debt to be repaid (Fargione et al., 2008).  
Although Jatropha was not yet included in these initial studies, they raised worldwide 
doubts about the desirability to promote biofuel investments of any sort. It did not take long 
before these concerns began to include Jatropha. Achten et al.'s (2008) worldwide Jatropha 
survey asserts: "The caused emission due to removal of (semi-) natural forest is a heavy 
burden on the initial GHG investment, which will take a significant time span before it is paid 
back with the GHG emission reduction of the use of the bio-diesel." A survey of 
environmental life cycle studies about Jatropha biofuels concluded that all of them were 
deficient in their treatment of land use change and thus too optimistic about the crop‟s GHG 
mitigation effects. Its own preliminary estimations of GHG emissions associated with the 
conversion of Miombo Woodlands – the dominant Sub-Saharan African ecosystem – into 
Jatropha plantations support Achten‟s qualitative conclusions (Romijn, 2010). 
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Regime conditions 
Steadily climbing fossil oil prices (see Figure 2) were the major energy regime feature in this 
period, both globally and locally. For the first time ever, the oil price broke through the US$ 
100 mark, and then continued to rise even further to US$ 147 per barrel during the 2nd 
quarter of 2008 (Bloomberg, 2008). This trend boosted large-scale biofuel energy 
investments, by fuelling widespread expectations of structurally high energy prices. The 
realisation was dawning worldwide that the era of cheap oil had come to a definitive end.  
However, we also see negative pressures beginning to emanate from Tanzania‟s dominant 
agricultural regime: While plantation investors often claimed land abundance, others began to 
point out that land that might seem unused at first sight can yet be valuable for its provision of 
durable ecosystem services, as a resource of various forest products, as spiritual places, and as 
roaming places for nomadic people and cattle. A World Bank report estimated that informal 
uses of local forests account for US$ 35-50 in generally unaccounted-for per capita income in 
Tanzania (Sulle and Nelson, 2009, p. 4). Also, the argument is surfacing that future land 
requirements for food crop cultivation restrict its availability for biofuel production, for 
example in traditional rotational agricultural schemes that are still widely practiced in 
Tanzania. Similar arguments are surfacing in relation to other countries, e.g. India. 
In response, several countries, regional groupings, and organisational networks stepped up 
efforts to institute committees to develop social and environmental sustainability criteria that 
biofuels must meet to ensure responsible practices (Lerner, 2008). The best-known national 
initiatives include: the RTFO (UK), the Cramer initiative (The Netherlands), the Social 
Biodiesel Schemes and Programme for Certification of Biofuels (Brazil) and the South 
African biofuel standard. Three international institutional initiatives were also started: The 
GBEP (G8+5, UN agencies), the BEFS and BIAS (FAO), and the EU Biofuels Directive. In 
addition there is an international voluntary initiative, the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels 
(RSB), which initiated a specific working group devoted to standard setting for Jatropha by 
mid 2009.  
 
Niche processes 
Due to these combined and cumulative landscape and regime pressures, the Tanzanian 
Jatropha niche comes under pressure to prove its environmental and social sustainability to 
various local and global stakeholders in order to avoid losing their public support base and 
their reputation (and access to finance to boot). The critical focus is mainly on large plantation 
projects connected to international investors, and on the government whose regulatory   25 
oversight of these schemes is seen to be inadequate. Global, Pan-African and local NGOs are 
among the first to become restive. The ABN flags potential threats to land, livelihoods, food 
security, biodiversity and water, and notes that the government of Tanzania has already 
surveyed many fertile regions with the best access to water, which also happen to be the 
regions where farmers are already growing food. It warns that Tanzania's main rice areas 
could be given over to biofuels production and that production of maize, wheat, beans and 
cassava may also be affected. The NGO accuses the government of having few qualms about 
evicting smallholders from their land. Perhaps worst of all, it predicts increased conflicts over 
already problematic water access when this resource will be diverted for biofuel irrigation 
(ABN, 2007).  
The biofuel sector in Tanzania had grown so large (approximately 38 leading actors in 
early 2008) that it also began to draw the attention of the international press. In May 2008, the 
Financial Times reported that the food versus fuel debate and associated turmoil had led to 
disarray in the Tanzanian government about how to proceed, "blowing hot and cold" 
depending on who's asking, and dithering over the introduction of effective regulation. A 
national biofuels policy was called for by concerned donors and investors who dearly desired 
more clarity about future prospects and land acquisition procedures, but so far divided 
politicians and the 'creaky government machinery' had not made much progress (Beattie, 
2008). The East African regional newspaper adds further inflammatory details about one 8000 
ha plantation scheme close to Dar es Salaam implemented by Sun Biofuels (UK), especially 
about its alleged lack of prior consultation with local affected villagers, the low wages on the 
plantation ($3 per day), the long land lease (99 years), and the danger that Tanzania might 
soon be overrun by similar investments, which would cause a major threat to its already 
precarious food security situation (Redfern, 2008).  
Further details about latent and rising inter-stakeholder contentions related to this case are 
given in Habib-Mintz (2010), based on stakeholder interviews. She found that one village had 
expressed reservations and had filed a formal objection that the company had earmarked more 
land than permitted by the village. While this was still being processed by the bureaucratic 
legal system, clear-cutting of forest began without completing village consultations, 
demarcations, and district level government approval. Problems were also found in relation to 
compensation payments. Some of the affected villagers only knew their name was on a list 
but did not know any details about the allocated land size. No contracts were drawn up and 
discussed with the village council and there had been no possibility to negotiate over 
payments. The district agricultural officer indicated that the actual per ha compensation paid   26 
was to the tune of one seventh of the estimated commercial value of the land lease. 
Contentions also arose over the magnitude of promised employment. Whereas the company 
gave out estimates ranging from 1000 to 4000 jobs per village at an annual wage of $1095 per 
person and promised to spend 5% of its annual budget on „social infrastructure‟, it became 
increasingly obvious that this would not be financially feasible due to the marginal 
profitability of Jatropha oil production when the fossil oil price would dive below US$ 100 
again (which it did very soon) with no likely repeat of the 2008 oil price spike any time soon 
(Habib-Mintz, 2010).  
Similar experiences have been reported in relation to EABD, an investor in remote Bahi, 
which bypassed the formal land acquisition procedures, instead approaching the local 
government directly. When the Regional Commissioner publicly denounced EABD activities 
as illegal, villagers got confused since they did not receive the information through the usual 
local government channel. In one village, fertile land was allocated to the investor without 
owner consent, or any formal notification to the district. When pressed about it, the investor 
threatened to move to another village, which upset villagers who were expecting major 
benefits promised by EABD. In one instance, one village gave away land legally belonging to 
another village. This transaction induced conflicts between food versus fuel crop cultivation 
involving neighbouring communities. EABD did not offer to pay any land compensation, 
instead promising large numbers of jobs, free local supply of Jatropha oil and by-products for 
lighting, cooking and so on, improved water distribution and substantial investments in 
community development projects. Several villagers were taken in by these promises (which 
were not backed up by written contracts) while others were doubtful or angry with the 
investor. Thus we see local conflicts emerging within village communities, as well as 
conflicts between communities, and between villagers and the investor. We also see that the 
government is also a multi-layered actor, whose employees can take different sides in the 
debate. Some take advantage of opaque procedures and institutional weaknesses to attract 
investors, whereas others try to uphold the law (Habib-Mintz, 2010). 
A few weeks after the East African article referred to above, the same newspaper hones in 
on a highly critical new report by Oxfam International (2008) claiming that the EU biofuel 
target could actually increase carbon emissions by 70 times by 2020, because of the required 
changes in land use (Oxfam International, 2008). The same article reports on a Tanzanian 
Member of Parliament (MP) cum environmentalist who takes the government to task over its 
rush to embrace biofuels without proper consideration. In reply, the Prime Minister announces 
that the Ministry of Energy and Minerals and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and   27 
Cooperatives have been tasked to come up with policy regulation, but that investments that 
are already underway in the country cannot be halted (Afandi, 22 July 2008). Just two days 
later, a local paper adds to the heat with an editorial stating that another concerned MP spoke 
in parliament about a Dutch investor acquiring long leases over very large tracts of fertile land 
directly from villagers in the Kilwa area, which it is not allowed to get without prior 
government permission under the 1999 Village land Act. The journalist laments that the 
government has remained silent, in spite of more and more reports and statements from local 
watchdogs, NGOs, university researchers and MPs expressing great concerns over the large-
scale allocation of fertile land (estimated by the Land Research and Resources Institute to 
amount to 641,170 ha by then) and the uncertainties hanging over the supposed benefits of 
biofuels like Jatropha. It is urged to act immediately to put regulatory and legislative 
mechanisms in place (The Citizen, 24 July 2008).  
An interesting example of academic voices in the debate is a presentation given in a 
biofuels conference in Dar es Salaam, which reported on survey findings from a 
multidisciplinary study group from Tanzania's three best known universities. The group 
noticed that the country's coastal regions top the investment list because of port facilities, a 
factor indicating that the biofuel business is mainly for export. This, they say, raises concern 
about benefit sharing for improved local livelihoods. Long term attractiveness of the current 
crops is also no certainty, in view of intensive ongoing research for more efficient biofuel 
crops. Will the costs of the loss in biodiversity and land degradation caused by these 
developments not outweigh short term financial gains? And finally, they draw attention to the 
need to build better national capabilities, research and transport infrastructure. In the absence 
of these assets, foreign investors will be induced to keep relying on foreign partners for key 
services and collaborations, thus contributing to exclusion of national parties and lost 
knowledge accumulation and local development opportunities (Mwamila, 2008).  
In retrospect, this brief period was a particularly tumultuous one in the biofuel 
development trajectory, both in the world at large and in poor developing countries like 
Tanzania, with the tumult mainly emanating from developments in the landscape and in the 
niche. The global landscape in particular contributed through enormous spikes in food prices, 
leading to social unrest in many countries. However, the energy regime also contributed 
through unprecedentedly high fossil oil prices. This boosted vast renewable energy 
investments by fuelling widespread expectations of structurally high energy prices.  
Whether or not biofuel investments indeed played a truly dominant role in causing these 
food price rises has remained a matter of some debate. However, a more important lesson that   28 
sunk in during this episode was that some of the major drivers of the food price hike 
constitute major structural developments – especially the steadily rising purchasing power in 
large emerging economies in Asia. Hence, the world can ill afford to devote vast tracts of 
arable land to the cultivation of biofuels. The public support base for large-scale plantation 
investments in biofuels began to erode, both globally and within Tanzania itself. 
 
Evolutionary motors 
This lesson began to sink in just as the first results of significant progress in learning in 
the emerging global Jatropha biofuel niche began to circulate. First of all, in addition to 
ongoing evolutionary variation we now begin to perceive evolutionary selection in Jatropha 
cultivation. The vital agronomic lesson emerging at this stage is that Jatropha is no different 
from any other wild crop: it can survive in drought-prone conditions and poor soils, but it 
cannot possibly be financially attractive and reliable under those conditions. The „selection‟ 
we observe is that this caused investors to scout for cultivable land, further inflaming the food 
versus fuel debate. This happens globally in Jatropha-producing regions, as well as in the 
local Jatropha niche in Tanzania. This dawning reality therefore also marks the start of 
„reflexive learning‟, i.e. second-order learning about the desirability or otherwise of Jatropha 
biofuels, driven by sustainability impacts. In Tanzania, the accumulation of problems with 
large plantations such as those detailed above for the cases of Sun Biofuels and EABD was 
beginning to cause disillusionments about the much hyped developmental benefits of the crop 
for poor developing countries. For many, this effectively punctured the overblown 
expectations that had been built up.  
In all this upheaval and contestation, it is hard to find evidence of additional evolutionary 
variation processes such as oil pressing and user applications, which along with agronomic 
learning had been the dominant drivers of progress in the sector until then. Undoubtedly these 
processes went on as before, but became eclipsed by the concerns with major unresolved 
issues relating to environmental and social sustainability. Still, in this period we cannot yet 
see any effects from the second (contestation and conflict) change motor on the nature and 
direction of the innovation process in the sector. At this stage, all we can see is fermentation, 
but no outcomes. This was to change in the next period (discussed in section 5.4 below). 
Seen through the lens of Greiner's framework, this is a period in which it is discovered 
that major parameters governing the future operation of the sector would need to be reset for 
further progress to be able to take place. We also see different parties mobilizing to make this 
happen, by doing research, writing reports, begin work on regulatory institutions, forming   29 
stakeholder forums, and striking up informal alliances (e.g., by supporting each other on 
blogsites and in the local press) to put pressure on other parties, especially large plantation 
investors, investment subsidy agencies and policy makers. Some of these parties form part of 
the (local or global) Jatropha niche itself, while others are more loosely connected to it, or 
form part of the contextual landscape. In any case, it is clear that the sources of contestation 
are not limited to regime or landscape domains, as the consensual SNM perspective assumes. 
We begin to discern the first selection results from these societal pressures and power 
struggles
ii in late 2008/early 2009, to which we now turn.  
 
5.4 Interrupted early growth: landscape & regime instability and niche conflict from mid 
2008 onwards 
 
Landscape and regime conditions 
The start of the final period in the development of the Jatropha sector so far is marked by the 
global financial crisis causing major energy regime instability – both at the global level and 
locally in Tanzania. The recession is associated with dramatically plunging oil prices and 
falling oil demand. The oil price plunged by US$ 115 from its peak of US$ 147 at the end of 
July 2008 to its lowest point of US$ 32 in December, the most precipitous fall the world had 
ever seen (The Economist, 23 May 2009, p. 69). Although long-term oil price projections 
point upwards again, the large swing caused major problems for renewable energy 
programmes worldwide, including those based on Jatropha bio-oil. By way of example, in 
October 2008 the fossil diesel CIF price at Dar es Salaam harbour had declined to US$ 0.80 
per litre (US$ 127.20 per barrel), whereas the cost of producing a litre Jatropha biodiesel 
excluding taxes was US$ 0.74 (or US$ 117.66 per barrel) (van Eijck, 2010, Table 5). This 
demonstrates how high the fossil diesel price has to be in order for Jatropha biodiesel to be 
able to be competitive under current conditions (assuming similar domestic taxes for both).  
Recently established EU biodiesel factories suddenly experienced dramatic overcapacity. 
By early 2009, only 60% of the German biodiesel production capacity was still in use, and 
several factories had closed down (MVO Magazine, May 2009). Producers of Jatropha 
feedstocks – particularly large export-oriented firms – had to revise their expectations about 
market prospects.  
Meanwhile, the severe food shortages and high food prices (national landscape factors) 
that are also experienced in this period begin to spur major concerns about the state of 
Tanzania‟s agricultural regime – the backwardness of the massive domestic agricultural   30 
smallholder sector and its inability to provide food security. One finds increasingly vociferous 
criticisms by actors such as NGOs, academics and journalists in the press and on blogs, about 
the neglect of these issues by the government (Godoy, 2009; Kamata, 2009). One journalist 
also criticises the wishy-washiness of a recent FAO report about the consequences of the large 
scale acquisition of African land by foreign investors. The FAO report emphasises the 
potential for macro-economic developmental benefits arising from this development, while 
underplaying the regulatory and legal requirements that need to be in place and to be enforced 
in order to guarantee the safeguarding of local Tanzanian interests. The journalist points out 
that African countries lack the required governance capacity. In these circumstances, a foreign 
investor can strike deals with corrupt representatives of the host state or local elites to get its 
way, while displaced smallholders do not have the wherewithal to negotiate fair deals, nor are 
they able to enforce agreements when the foreign party fails to deliver promised services such 
as employment or public services (Godoy, 2009).  
Another piece suggestively titled “Imperial Projects and the Food Crisis in the Periphery” 
reports on a seminar held at the University of Dar es Salaam by concerned academics. It 
draws attention to the long historical neglect of Tanzania‟s agricultural smallholder sector and 
its colonial history, when rulers gave preference to cash crops for export, or to the modern 
food sector. The biofuel wave is feared to be a continuation of these past policies (Kamata, 
2009). Similar sentiments are expressed in international publications (e.g., Dauvergne and 
Neville, 2009). Another local academic details the impacts of advancing Jatropha cultivation 
on Maasai pastoralists, including loss of grazing lands and spiritually significant places. It 
also cautions NGOs that try to involve Maasai in cultivation of Jatropha themselves. Many 
Maasai apparently experience it as upsetting their traditional ways of life and culture, though 
they might not say so openly (Laltaika, 2008).    
 
Niche processes and evolutionary motors in mutual interaction 
The main developments in the Tanzanian Jatropha niche at this stage are detailed in our 
second survey in sept-nov 2008. Looking first at the network dimension of niche development, 
we note that the network has expanded exponentially. In addition to the two original lead 
players in 2005 (Kakute and Diligent Tanzania Ltd) there is a raft of major new players, many 
of them large plantation investors. At the same time, the original incumbents continue to play 
a core role in the expanding network because of their experience, accumulated knowledge and 
contacts with farmers. Diligent is the first to start oil pressing on a commercial scale, and new 
start ups in the sector are keen to absorb these lessons, as well as its experiences with   31 
managing a decentralised supplier network and cultivation-related lessons. The company 
becomes flooded with curious visitors almost on a daily basis, to the point where it has to 
appoint a public relations officer in order to regain control on the public dissemination of 
information. In terms of organisation, we note considerable development associated with 
increasing specialisation of functions driven by growing volumes of production and trade. The 
different stakeholders were found to execute a number of increasingly differentiated roles, 
including: cultivation; processing; knowledge and consultancy; financing; purchasing of end 
products; special interest group promotion and lobbying; regulation; machinery supply and 
new equipment development (Roks and van Vlimmeren, 2009, pp 47-49). There is also some 
progress in terms of institutional development. In mid 2009, a number of private biofuel 
producers formed an association for the purpose of collaboration on research and lobbying for 
coherent and transparent policies (ProBEC, 2009). The network is thus developing 
considerable specialisation and gaining more depth in its functions, as well as growing fast in 
terms of sheer size. There are clear connections between the early projects and later ones, in 
terms of involved parties, cumulativeness of learning (see below for more details) and logical 
progression in the emergence and organisation of different functions. Thus, we can justifiably 
begin to speak of the maturing of a cohesive niche, the first step towards the emergence of a 
full-fledged innovation system.  
Next, we consider some important niche learning processes. The stellar growth, combined 
with the adverse landscape constellation and the absence of effective regulation, conspire to 
feed worries about the current and future impacts of the sector, fed by frequent articles in the 
local and international press and parliamentary debates. Several leading NGOs start 
investigating. One study by the WWF Tanzania chapter with support from WWF Sweden in 
2008 contains damning findings regarding the location decisions, investment procedures and 
operations of some of the foreign plantation investors (WWF-Tanzania Programme Office, 
2009). Another study by the Tanzania National Research Forum‟s Forestry Working Group 
and the International Institute for Environment and Development, estimates that a total of 
640,000 ha had been allocated for biofuel investments, with approximately 4 million ha being 
requested by investors. It also estimates that between 5000 and 10000 local people have been 
affected so far, leading to the alienation of their rights over customary lands (Sulle, 2009). 
More examples of critiques are given in the analysis below.  
Before delving further into the learning details, we first present some brief information 
about the actual developments on the ground that are important for understanding the nature 
and direction of learning in this period. In particular, the future outlook for Jatropha looks   32 
more mixed than the recent fast growth of the niche suggests. Despite increasing international 
landscape pressures favoring renewables for environmental and energy security reasons, local 
user preferences in Tanzania are primarily based on price because of the poverty. Hence, the 
crash of the fossil fuel price in the fall and winter of 2008 was, on the whole, a bad thing for 
the development of an economically viable local Jatropha sector that would cater to local 
needs. This is especially true for the national regime-competitive applications, such as 
Jatropha fuel for transportation or lighting. However, since the quantities of Jatropha oil that 
are actually reaching these markets are still minimal in any case, there was not much short-
term negative impact there.  
The outlook is better for local Jatropha applications that do not aim for substitution of an 
existing energy regime. For example, some projects aim for rural electrification in places 
where the fossil-based regime is not yet present. Prospects in these local sheltered spaces 
continue to appear to be somewhat promising, also because the desirability of local 
applications for Jatropha – as opposed to export to western markets – is increasingly being 
emphasized in international publications (Tilman, 2009, Vilt, 2009). It has become easy for 
NGOs to acquire donor finance for such applications because their multipurpose functions, 
including a focus on Millennium Development Goals such as poverty alleviation, gender 
equity, and environmental protection, and their potential to foster local democracy and 
decentralized development fit well with the dominant priorities in the extant development 
discourse, or „international aid landscape‟ (Nygaard, 2010). A local technology development 
organisation, TaTEDO, announced that it had received funding from Dutch parties to 
implement 100 additional LMPs along the lines of the two experimental ones installed earlier, 
even though these were not yet functioning adequately. A recent review of LMPs in West 
Africa has shown their financial viability to be quite bad when they are run on Jatropha oil, 
which have caused many to revert to fossil diesel, and others to shut down completely 
(Nygaard, 2010). Unless Jatropha is introduced on a commercially sound basis and 
accompanied by strong local capacity building for project management and maintenance, the 
biofuel-based LMP concept will not be sustainable after the donors pull out (Trondsen, 2009; 
Wijgerse, 2007). If things don‟t improve fast enough, we expect that the LMP model might 
become subject to negative selection. 
The learning in the niche is still mostly supplier-driven (about costs, technical 
performance, etc). User involvement is still limited. At the same time, learning mechanisms 
have expanded from trial and error in 2005 to systematic search, use of test plots, use of 
literature, internet use, participation in international conferences, etc. in 2008/9. As a result,   33 
enough lessons have accumulated for local actors to agree that the technology functions well 
enough. Further learning is geared towards overcoming problems in other dimensions, e.g., to 
improve alignment in preferences between users and suppliers, or to minimize ecological 
impact. Technological learning is also still ongoing, e.g. experiments with biodiesel through 
transesterification and blending yield new facts and possible practical lessons around this new 
product. Also, in order to extract more value from the Jatropha seeds, actors continue to 
search for, and experiment with ways of using the seed cake. Stimulated by user preferences 
and possible future regulation, some actors also investigate properties of the Jatropha oil. One 
company installed its own laboratory facilities to do this. This company also assists the 
government with the drawing up of national technical standards, since the government‟s own 
facilities and capabilities are insufficient (Romijn, 2008). Actors also continue to learn about 
the agronomical properties of Jatropha and conditions affecting plant growth and yield. A 
new experience concerns bottlenecks with seed supply logistics. These begin to be seen as a 
barrier for the further development of the Jatropha technology particularly by OM companies. 
One project is setting up an efficient supply chain for large scale decentralized production 
involving thousands of outgrowers, based on regional collection centres that are also hubs for 
training and extension work.  
Early learning on the user-side gets also under way at last. There are different experiments 
related to different end uses (Roks and van Vlimmeren, 2009). Here we see a new instance of 
evolutionary variation occurring. So far, distribution has been done with barrels delivered to 
special user categories, including eco-safari companies, a local soap producer and Boeing 
(15,000 litres in 15 barrels exported by air) which used the oil for a successful test flight in a 
Air New Zealand plane in December 2008. Local usage of PPO in older vintage stationary 
diesel engines – as designed for the rural LMPs, is also being considered. Another promising 
end use is biodiesel for clients like eco-safari companies. Different applications for the seed 
cake, such as briquetting and charcoal making, already mentioned as possibilities in the 2005 
survey, are now being tried out. Many projects have not settled on the main type of end-use 
that they will go for, but socio-political pressures against large-scale (raw seed) export for 
western markets are mounting.  
We also begin to see the first instance of (negative) evolutionary selection. One project 
being pursued was the use of PPO in the Protos, a cooking stove developed by BSH Bosch 
und Siemens Hausgeräte GmbH. However, an experiment with local users failed because of 
fast clogging of the pipes, high oil costs, and unreliable supply of Jatropha oil. The 
experiment was discontinued, and so far no new cooking oil experiments have taken place,   34 
although the Protos design has since been improved and the clogging problem has been 
solved. The stove is now being successfully mass-marketed in Indonesia, but its market 
potential in Eastern Africa remains to be assessed. 
All the learning processes detailed up to now in this paper can be mainly associated with 
the first change motor in our framework, i.e., evolutionary variation and selection. At this 
point in time, however, the influence on the sectoral innovation process from the second 
change motor - contestation and conflict - becomes evident as well. This happens under the 
influence of reflexive impact learning which is picking up speed as a result of the 
accumulation of results by various studies and press reports.  
One major aspect of impact learning concerns environmental sustainability effects of 
Jatropha investments. It is becoming increasingly evident that these effects differ markedly 
across different business models. Some large plantations are found to be infringing on 
ecologically rich areas (such as Tanzania‟s coastal forest belt) and these are thought to have 
invasive effects on flora and fauna. These projects are not necessarily favorable in terms of 
GHG emission reductions either, because they cause carbon emissions from clearing 
vegetation and disturbing soils that have never been tilled before (Dehue and Hettinga 2008, 
Reinhardt et al. 2007; Romijn, 2010; Veen and Carrillo, 2009). The OM and LMP models are 
emerging as the ecologically soundest options, because Jatropha is generally not planted on 
uncultivated land (it is rather intercropped with food crops, or planted as hedges around crop 
fields because of the better fertility of the land in those conditions, see: Wahl et al., 2009; 
Wiskerke et al. 2010; Messemaker, 2008; Kempf, 2007; Mitchell, 2008), while it also does 
not compete much with food production (Struijs, 2008; FAO, 2010; Gordon-Maclean et al. 
2008; Mitchell 2008; Loos, 2008). 
On the social dimension, the three business models are more competitive. Large 
plantations offer much short term wage employment, although longer term employment is 
uncertain, and plantations use a lot of village land. Longer term implications for local food 
security are also still questionable. The OM and LMP models offer much less full-time 
employment, and only limited supplementary income to poor smallholder farmers (Loos, 
2008; Mitchell, 2008b), but their labour/capital ratio tends to be higher than those of 
plantations because they can make do with much smaller fixed capital investments 
(AgentschapNL, 2010, forthcoming). Their impact on food security is expected to be 
minimal, as investors do not acquire land. The LMP schemes are expected to have the best 
social results, because they are designed to combine benefits for local growers with benefits   35 
for local energy users, although there are many problematic economic and organizational 
aspects associated with these schemes, as noted before.  
The overall balance of all the emerging pros and cons associated with the different 
business models have the effect of putting the Jatropha plantation model under a lot of 
pressure towards more environmentally responsible practices. The LMP schemes, which tend 
to be NGO-financed, are still left off the hook for the time being. The pressure on the LPs 
comes in the form of societal contestation from a range of actors including NGOs, anti-
biofuel government representatives, critical journalists and newspapers, and academics, in 
turn aided by international stakeholders of similar stripes. The same holds for recently started 
palm oil and sugar cane plantations.  
This is beginning to have effects on the nature and direction of the innovation process in 
the sector as a whole. Such effects can take place through various mechanisms, including exit 
of firms with characteristics that are widely considered to undesirable and entry of more firms 
with more desirable characteristics. It can also manifest itself through an organizational 
reorientation of operations in ongoing companies, e.g. making increased efforts to serve 
local/national (rather than international) oil markets, experimenting with local-foreign 
partnership arrangements, and using less mechanized technologies in order to generate more 
employment.  
A third selection pressure mechanism could be purposive investments by companies in 
reflexive learning through technical experimentation. However, despite the mounting societal 
pressures and contestation, we have found only limited experiments set up for the sole 
purpose of broad social and ecological sustainability-related learning. Learning about 
ecological sustainability occurs through literature search, limited data collection, and simple 
tests performed in the projects, e.g., about poisonous qualities, effects of Jatropha on soil 
quality, and the effect of Jatropha on nitrogen depletion and how to prevent this through 
intercropping with leguminous plants or feeding back the seedcake. Regarding the impact on 
global warming, some lessons are being learnt through monitoring in ongoing projects. One 
investor is beginning to measure carbon sequestration in its growing Jatropha plants.  
The first consequence of selection pressure through the exit mechanism comes in the form 
of the withdrawal of a Swedish ethanol producer from sugarcane. SEKAB received a great 
deal of adverse publicity in the Tanzanian press and on environmental blog sites related to its 
water use, its adverse impacts on the valuable local ecosystem and its dubious social effects (a 
good example is Madoffe et al., 2009). When the news reached the Swedish parliament and 
the Swedish public, SEKAB found it impossible to raise the additional funds it needed to   36 
make its plantations operational. It announced its withdrawal from Tanzania in January 2009 
(although it seems to be trying to restart under a different name).  
A second victim in the making – through exit or organisational re-orientation – is the 
Dutch Kilwa-based Jatropha producer Bioshape that had set its sights on 80,000 ha of 
„degraded Miombo‟ that turned out to include sections of valuable coastal forest according to 
the WWF (WWF-Tanzania Programme Office, 2009). One of the investors in the company 
got cold feet and halved its share, leaving the firm with an acute cash flow problem. This 
company has not withdrawn from Tanzania, but the Dutch mother company has been declared 
banckrupt in 2010, and a new owner is being sought for the Tanzanian subsidiary. If this 
happens, the company will have to reorient its operations in order to show – to future 
investors and others – that it is capable of developing truly sustainable operations.  
Another aspect of sustainability-related learning that puts special selection pressure on the 
plantation investors concerns the formation and implementation of rules, regulations and 
standards. Within Tanzania, this issue came to the fore after the National Biofuel Taskforce – 
constituted by the government in 2006, but initially not quick-acting – finally came with its 
first results in August 2008 in the form of a Draft National Biofuel Guideline. The task force 
includes a representative selection of industry stakeholders, who debated and helped to set the 
definition of national standards for the quality of biodiesel and bioethanol (now completed, 
with the help of the one firm with a laboratory), and how the government should enforce these 
standards (still ongoing). A need for clear rules about taxes on Jatropha biofuels was also 
voiced during the consultation process. But perhaps the most important issue tackled by the 
Taskforce has been the formulation of guidelines on respecting biodiversity, ensuring food 
security and preventing exploitation of villagers, e.g. in the form of rules on how to acquire 
land, and introducing land zoning. A revised/improved guideline was issued in November 
2008 which has been passed by parliament. However, in 2010, the guideline had still not been 
approved by the Cabinet. The delay has attracted severe criticism from the local media 
(Mngazija, Daily News, 12 Oct 2009; Kandoya, Daily News, 4 Oct, 2009). Even villagers had 
become so politically aware by this time that they refused to sign a recent land lease contract 
with a major investor Sun Biofuels, for its expanding plantations in Kisarawe district 
(Lugungulo, Daily News, 12 October 2009).  
Worse than the pressures from within the Tanzanian system are those emerging with 
respect to international norms and standards currently under development, such as the Dutch 
NEN NTA8081 (currently in the trial stage), the GBEP GHG guidelines (GBEP, 2009), the 
UK RTFO standard and the EU RED (McGregor, 2008). As stated earlier, biofuels are also   37 
approved for inclusion into the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
generates high expectations of gaining carbon credits among investors. For the actors 
targeting international markets, learning had to begin about how to match their practices to 
these new standards and potential opportunities. The standardization and certification efforts 
are clearly linked to landscape pressures: negotiations are underway to create a successor 
treaty to Kyoto, which ends in 2012, and to the implementation of RED in early 2011. New 
binding commitments on the part of member countries towards reducing GHG emissions are 
obviously expected to be included. In connection with this development, worldwide efforts to 
define truly sustainable biofuels are being stepped up (see, e.g.,Tilman et al., 2009). The 
formation and introduction of trade standards, certification, and carbon trading are widely 
being seen as suitable and necessary instruments for market regulation and promotion of 
sustainable practices by investors: the idea is that they can only earn carbon credits and 
market access in major western markets when they are able to prove that they meet certain 
social and environmental requirements. 
The third niche process, formation and evolution of stakeholder expectations, suggests 
that the sector is still very much in a flux and expectation-alignment among stakeholders is 
only just beginning, and covers only a few broad areas. No dominant design is being foreseen 
yet, although the stakeholders observe that the OM has achieved the most stable situation in 
respect of supply and demand and public acceptance. Tanzanian Jatropha insiders also expect 
the OM model to top the list in terms of market size and surface area in future years (Roks 
and van Vlimmeren, 2009, p. 64). However, the logistics, extension, and certification 
requirements of this model will become highly complex and costly when OM companies 
grow large, encompassing thousands or even tens of thousands of small contract farmers. We 
also see ongoing evolutionary variation: some OM investors are now considering hybrid 
business models, comprising a core plantation supported by a sizeable outgrower system 
(Vermeulen en Cotula, 2010). Other ideas include hiving off all the labour-intensive training, 
extension, standards monitoring and seeds collection activities into a separate non-profit 
foundation that may qualify for carbon credit funding and can attract socially ethical investors 
who cannot involve themselves as co-owners in a commercial entity. This could be a way to 
cover the structurally high costs of working with smallholders (van Eijck, 2009; van Eck, 
2009).  
Another major expectation is that by-products must be used for the achievement of 
financial profitability for investors; and that in addition, seed yields can and must also be 
increased through improved crop management, better seed varieties, etc. Actors generally   38 
expect that the financial feasibility of Jatropha projects can and should be improved strongly 
for the sector to become economically sustainable in the longer term. This requirement is 
likely to drive some convergence between the dominant LP and OM models. For the OM 
businesses this will likely involve some sacrifices in terms of social and environmental 
sustainability in order to improve their financial profitability, e.g., through adding central 
plantations alongside their expensive and complex outgrower systems; whereas the LP 
companies could improve their performance on the environmental and social scores to some 
extent by adopting locally less invasive arrangements, e.g., in the form of partnerships with 
co-operations of local farmers who cultivate adjoining plots of land („block plantations‟) 
without acquiring their land (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010).  
However, it is still an open question to what extent an acceptable balance between the 
three PPP-sustainability elements (and their sub-elements) will be achieved in this way. 
Significant trade-offs between them have emerged, and it remains to be seen if the sector will 
ever get the opportunity and time to work out compromises that are broadly acceptable for all 
stakeholders. In October 2009, the East African reported that the Tanzanian government was 
finally giving in to the public pressure by suspending all new investments and acquisition of 
new lands by investors already in the country, until it had reviewed the selection criteria for 
each investment and drawn up clear policies and procedures. This followed a report in the 
same newspaper a few days earlier, in which an academic from Sokoine University of 
Agriculture accused the government of treating the biofuels sector as a „bottomless pit‟ at the 
expense of local farmers after it had emerged that 5000 rice farmers were being evicted to 
pave the way for plantations (Mande, 5 October 2009). In this latest development, then, we 
recognize the question mark indicating the undefined end stage in Greiner‟s model.  
 




From this review about the development of the Jatropha biofuels sector in Tanzania we can 
conclude that the sector has evolved from an embryonic state in early 2005 to an early-stage 
sectoral system of innovation and production in late 2009. That is to say, in 2009 it had grown 
into a network consisting of well over 40 lead actors, each with their own local and global 
network, which are undertaking different functions covering the entire supply chain as well as   39 
involving various chain-supporting organisations and many thousands of outgrowers and 
wage workers. This is in itself a remarkable achievement.  
Our analysis with the multilevel SNM framework provides good insights into why the 
sector developed so quickly. Notably, there were a number of powerful investment drivers in 
the landscape and regime, such as rising awareness about dangers of climate change, 
temporary high energy prices, and mandatory blending requirements and subsidies overseas.  
At the same time, the fast pace of investment has had its clear downsides. Most investors 
piled into the country in a great rush, without much regard to possible longer-term effects of 
an as yet unknown wild crop. This bandwagon effect is at least in part responsible for the 
major social and the environmental sustainability problems that soon began to emerge. Many 
investors did not take time to start experimenting on a small scale, so that the puncturing of 
the hype of Jatropha as a reliable and viable oil crop for marginal soils gave many large 
investors a particularly hard hit from which some may not recover. Added to this were major 
landscape and agricultural-regime instabilities that led to an unprecedented spike in 
worldwide food prices, igniting a worldwide food versus fuel debate (even if the extent to 
which the biofuel rush actually contributed to the food price rises has remained contentious).  
Although many in the industry are drawing lessons in hindsight, it is doubtful whether the 
boom-bust phenomenon and its fallouts could have been prevented through more pro-active 
policies and better regulation and enforcement, involving more attention to social and 
environmental sustainability impacts of projects. Policy institutions in most African countries 
have weak capabilities for pro-active decision making. At the time the biofuel boom began, 
some countries – including Tanzania – did not even have a renewable energy policy in place 
that could have provided guidelines for regulating investment and facilitating orderly and 
sustainable market development. But weak institutions are only partly to blame. Even leading 
international aid institutions full of experts were taken by surprise over the „third globalisation 
wave‟, due to the suddenness and unprecedented scale on which foreign investments for 
large-scale fuel (and food) production in Africa occurred. Furthermore, much international 
(and local) disagreement over the desirability of these developments has arisen. Many 
governments in the South are essentially still groping in the dark about the best way forward, 
trying to weigh the pros and cons. Promises of new economic opportunities (and warnings 
about missing out on them through restrictive policies) voiced by proponents stand squarely 
against the adverse impacts on local livelihoods and ecosystems, and loss of sovereignty and 
domestic food security stressed by others (e.g., The Economist, 21 May 2009). The large 
controversies, conflicting interests, power inequalities between the key parties, and   40 
uncertainties over long-term outcomes have hindered effective and speedy policy action, 
along with lack of governance capability.     
As a result, the sector – if we can call it that – is still highly unstable and its future is 
uncertain. Whilst economic viability is still not assured, and much further experimentation 
and learning is required to raise yields and efficiency, the general public and many interest 
groups – both in Tanzania (and many other African countries) and abroad – may not have 
enough patience to wait for these outcomes because of their urgent concerns over food 
security, adverse ecological impacts and socio-economic marginalisation of vulnerable 
groups. In that sense, our analysis confirms Greiner's idea of an open-ended process which is 
driven by its own internal dynamics without being pulled by a defined end state, and which 
does not follow a strict sequence of prescribed evolutionary stages.  
One problem is that the sector‟s development into a full-fledged innovation system still 
requires considerable technological capability building, and this requires sustained efforts, 
investments and time, as well as facilitative government. The need for capability building has 
been emphasized by a raft of publications about technology and development, mainly drawing 
on successful development in East Asia where the sustained acquisition of technological, 
managerial and organisational skills and knowledge by industry was supported by stimulating 
government policies and gave rise to durable dynamic competitiveness (e.g., Ernst et al., 
1998, Lall, 1992). There is an equivalent literature dealing with best practices in development 
projects and programmes, which concentrates on addressing issues such as feasible business 
models, innovation for cost-reduction, market development, standards development and 
enforcement, development of appropriate credit mechanisms and technology support services, 
and the role of R&D and how it should link to market parties, and so on (e.g. Martinot et al, 
2001; Brew-Hammond et al., 2008). These lessons are clearly relevant for Jatropha in 
Tanzania. In this case, important missing or weak capabilities include, among others, the 
absence of a well-equipped and well-funded national R&D institutions, the absence of micro-
credit facilities that can fund innovative smallholder farmers in rural areas, rudimentary 
standardisation and metrology services, grossly underfunded agricultural extension services, 
and the lack of objective intermediaries who can assist between foreign and local parties in 
negotiating fair and transparent land deals. Overall, we conclude that although the sector has 
become sizeable in terms of the number of, and variety in participating parties, in terms of key 
capabilities it is still in the early stages of innovation system development.  
In addition to gaps in technological capability, our analysis has thrown up additional 
essential functions that are still underdeveloped. These include systematic reflexive (impact)   41 
learning and inter-stakeholder conflict-management capabilities. It the literature about 
technological capability building there has been little (if any) attention for the need to develop 
these broader societal capacities. This is most likely caused by a key limitation in that 
literature, namely its concern with economic competitiveness and its neglect of the 
imperatives of environmental and social/ethical sustainability issues. However, current-day 
technological developments and economic pressures in many sectors are so far-reaching, 
conflicting interests so powerful, and societal uncertainties about impacts so great, that social 
and environmental sustainability will and do increasingly come to the fore alongside 
economic competitiveness concerns. Our Jatropha-Tanzania case is just one particular 
example of how these concerns can impose themselves on the development of innovation 
systems, but there are likely to be many others (think, e.g., of nanotechnology or genetic 
engineering applications). It is therefore encouraging to note that recent development 
literature is beginning to make forays into the exploration of capacity/capability requirements 
to address these wider issues. E.g., the capacity development approach championed by the 
UNDP points towards the need to grow local capacities for designing suitable institutional 
arrangements, growing leadership capacity, developing accountability and promoting 
transparency, and promoting knowledge accumulation by different stakeholders (UNDP, 
2008). Such capacities are important elements of what we would like to single out as key 
concerns based on our case evidence, namely, the development of capacity of individuals, 
organisations, innovation systems and countries to manage resource-related contentions and 
conflicts. The development of innovation systems such as Jatropha biofuels thus requires a 
combination of supportive reflexive innovation system policies and evolving systems of 
regulation and control to contain side-effects and transfer of problems. This conclusion fits 
with the SNM perspective on the stimulation of innovation through balancing of protection 
and selection pressure.  
We were unable to explore the suitability of Greiner's model to the full in our analysis, 
because of the very recent emergence of the Jatropha biofuels industry. Our timeline covers 
just four years and a few stages, including only one stage of contestation and conflict, which 
has not reached any acceptable compromise at the time of writing. Yet we are convinced that 
a combination of two evolutionary drivers of change, consisting of gradual evolutionary 
variation and selection and more discontinuous processes of conflict driven by performance 
trade-offs between core sustainability dimensions, is required to explain the evolution of the 
sector. An analysis of dialectic stakeholder relations and how these shape sectoral 
development represents a significant advance on earlier studies about innovation systems,   42 
especially where it concerns sectors that generate radically new technologies. The 
development of these sectors raises many contentious issues that are relevant to many 
different stakeholders, whether they live close to the implementation scene or thousands of 
miles away. In that sense, it is hard to separate the influencing factors that drive the sector into 
"local" and "global". Stakeholders near and far strike up alliances, for instance through 
research collaborations, financing, trade linkages, and so on, and it is impossible to determine 
who is influencing whom. The local-global interface is likely to be an intricate two-way 
process. Further field research on this global local interface could shed more light on its 
causalities and drivers.   43 
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Table 1: Summary of the establishment of a Tanzanian Jatropha innovation system, 2005-9  




„Frustrated early growth‟ 
early 2008 
„Interrupted early growth‟ 
late 2008 - 2009 
Landscape  Increasing international 
concerns about 
greenhouse effect -> 
intensifying search for 
renewable energy techs 
Kyoto ratified: carbon 
market trading starts 
(CDM)  
Perception about Africa: 
vast empty lands 
Tanzania: politically stable, 
welcomes TNCs,NGOs. 
But: ineffective political 
governance, poverty, 
weak infrastructure & 
institutions 
Further international 
concerns about GHGs  
(IPCC report, 2007; An 
Inconvenient Truth, etc.)  
Mandatory biofuel blending 
targets introduced by 
EU,US, Brazil, India, 
etc.  
Subsidies & investment 
inducements for western 
investors through 
directives to create 
markets in developed 
economies  
Huge spike in world food 
prices and drought in East 
Africa  
Tanzanian public wakes up 
to structural neglect of 
smallholder agriculture 
and food security issues 
Global food versus fuel 
debate ignited  
 
Global recession: food 
prices come down 
Overcapacity in western 
biodiesel factories, some 
keel over 
Global credit crunch -> hard 
to boost cash flow in LP 
investments 
East African  drought 
continues. Food vs fuel 
debate, and debate about 
neglect of agricultural 
smallholder sector 
continues. 
Regime  High dependence on 
imported costly fossil 
fuels. 
Poor peasant farmers  
Basic capacity in oil 
pressing technologies 
Complex land acquisition 
procedures and latent 
public opposition 
towards land acquisition 
by foreigners due to bad 
historical  experiences 
Rising fossil oil price: 
increasingly heavy 




market situation for 
developing renewables 
Continued rising fossil oil 
price: favourable for 
renewables. 
But also: emerging 
evidence that „non-arable 
lands‟ are often not empty 
wastelands, they are 
utilised and valuable for 
local populations 
 
Fossil fuel prices crash from 
US$ 147 (July) to US$ 
32 per barrel (Dec), 
causing the 
short/medium outlook 







expectations esp. about 
yields and economic 
benefits drives growth 
 Technical / agronomic 
learning only, mostly 
about cultivation, no 
lessons about possible 
end-uses. No societal 
impact learning. 
Incipient network  with 
just two small lead 
players: NGO and a small 
TNC, absent government 
Hype formation (shared 
beliefs based on rumours, 
not experiences -> 
Jatropha takes minimum 
3 years to yield first 
harvest 
Growing network: 
Tanzania deluged by 
western TNCs 
 
Puncturing of the hype 
Global niche development: 
work on biofuel standards 
stepped up (Cramer, 
RTFO, EU, Brazil, GBEP, 
FAO, RSB...): Science 
publications: Biofuel 
LCAs neglect land use 
change: possibly long  
'carbon debts' 
Jatropha global & local 
niche developments: 
Early learning experiences 
show: Jatropha ≠ wonder 
crop: profitable yields 
incompatible with 
cultivation on wastelands -
> pressure to scout for 
fertile croplands or forests, 
danger of displacing 
people, fauna & flora, 








Learning is widespread in 
technologies, agronomy 
& production; starting in 
end-use & logistics; 
taking off fast in social 
& environmental 
impacts; search for 
innovative hybrid 
business models 
Start of selection in 
business models (some 
LPs keel over).  
Large network, many 
specialised functions, 
draft national biofuel 
guideline adopted, but 








variation, no selection 
No clear business models, 
just some loose 
experiments 
Evolutionary variation in 
tech & organisation; no 
selection yet 
Emerging variation in 
business models: 
1. Local Multifunctional 
Platform (LMP, copied 
from Mali); local rural 
markets 




3. Centralised Large 
Plantations (LP): western 
markets 
Start of 'reflexive' 
learning 
Selection pressures are 
building, but no selection 
results yet.  
Much progress in 
evolutionary variation 
& selection, but 
swamped by conflicts 
reported in media.  





No conflicts: plenty of 
space for each small actor 
to operate in 
First critical remarks 
being made about LP 
practices (a few local 
press & NGO statements) 
Growing contestation: 
Pressure on investors to 
address social & 
environmental     
sustainability problems 
and to address concerns 
about economic viability 
at the same time 
Further growing 
contestation: 
Stream of NGO 
investigations (local-
global alliances), esp. 
aimed at LP model  
Barrage of local, regional 
and western newspaper 
articles critical of LPs 
and inaction by govt 
Flood of internet blogs, 
local & western 
contributors 
Many presentations at 
regional / local 
conferences and 




agriculture and pushing 
neo-colonial raw 
material exports  
Western funding of 
stakeholders consultation 
for drafting government 
biofuel policy guideline.  
Exposure of malpractices: 
forced displacement, 
improper land lease 
negotiations, inadequate 
compensation, land 
conversion in wrong 
places, GHG emissions 
from virgin land 
conversion, etc.  
In Nov 2009 the 
governments halts all 
new investments in 
biofuels. 
Conflict is glo-cal: Global 
and local cannot be 
disentangled.   54 
Figure 1: Structure of empirical analysis in section 5 














Change motors  
1. Evolutionary variation &  
selection (in terms of  
technology and business  
organisation) 
2. Contestation & conflict 
 between stakeholders 
 
     55 
 
Source: http://www.oilnergy.com/1obrent.htm#since88 
Figure 2: Fossil oil price 1988-2010    56 
Notes 
                                                 
i For evidence that Jatropha was indeed a hype, see Achten et al, 2010 and 2007, and Fairless, 2007. A general 
treatment of the phenomenon of hype in new technologies can be found in Ruef and Markard (2010). 
ii In evolutionary theory, selection pressure is defined as “the intensity with which an environment tends to 
eliminate an organism, and thus its genes, or to give it an adaptive advantage” (International Society for 
Complexity, Information, and Design Encyclopedia of Science and Philosophy, 
http://www.iscid.org/encyclopedia/Selection_Pressure).  